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Not All “Units” Are Created Equal: How Hebble v. Shell
Western E & P, Inc. Missed an Opportunity to Curb the
Expansion of Fiduciary Obligations in Oklahoma Oil and
Gas Law
I. Introduction
In Hebble v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals further expanded a line of cases that has imposed increasingly
onerous fiduciary obligations upon oil and gas operators in Oklahoma.1
Prior to Hebble, a fiduciary obligation was imposed on an operator only
after the state modified rights of interested parties.2 For example, such a
modification occurs in a forced pooling action when the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission (Commission) forces a landowner to transfer his
mineral interest to an operator or else participate in the proposed drilling.3
The plaintiffs in Hebble sought compensation for underpaid royalties
from wells drilled in the 1970s and argued for relief based both in tort and
contract.4 One of the wells implicated in this case, the Brittain Deep No. 2
Sycamore well, was drilled subject to a voluntary joint operating
agreement.5 The joint operating agreement did not implicate the police
powers of the state because the Commission did not need to issue an order
compelling the cooperative development of the unit.6
With little
explanation or discussion, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals identified
the drilling and spacing order as the state’s modification of the plaintiffs’
rights, despite the fact that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had declined to do
so only five years earlier.7
Many oil and gas terms and statutes are interrelated in both function and
purpose, leading to many instances in which distinct legal terms such as
“drilling and spacing units,” “forced pooling,” and “unitization” are
improperly used.8 Even within one state, the distinctions between different
types of oil and gas “units” can be subtle yet important. In Hebble, for
example, the court ignored important distinctions and significantly
1. See generally 238 P.3d 939 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010).
2. See Howell v. Texaco, Inc., 112 P.3d 1154, 1160 (Okla. 2004).
3. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(a) (2000).
4. See Hebble, 238 P.3d at 941.
5. See id. at 943.
6. See id.
7. See id.; see also Howell, 112 P.3d at 1160-61.
8. See, e.g., Ward v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972) (addressing the
common confusion between drilling and spacing units and forced pooling).
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expanded the circumstances in which an oil and gas operator can be
burdened with fiduciary duties. The court inappropriately equated a
Commission drilling and spacing order to a Commission unitization order.9
The units resulting from these orders differ substantially in both form and
purpose. A Commission order that unitizes a field for secondary recovery
operations substantially alters the rights among the interested parties,
whereas a drilling and spacing order merely sets out which parties have the
rights to production within the unit.10 The Hebble opinion provides little
insight into which characteristics of a drilling and spacing order the court
felt were similar enough to a unitization order to warrant the imposition of
fiduciary obligations on the operator.11
In Hebble, the operator (Shell) was held liable for $53,625,000 in
punitive damages based on its underpayment of roughly $750,000 in
royalties owed on two wells drilled in the 1970s.12 A punitive award of this
magnitude has serious implications for the oil and gas industry in
Oklahoma. An operator’s potential liability resulting from this decision is
incongruent with the simple nature and purpose of the drilling and spacing
unit.
This note will attempt to present the Hebble opinion in a simple and
understandable manner, point out the deficiencies in its reasoning, and
explain how its holding can impact the oil and gas industry going forward.
Part II explains the background and purpose of the Commission’s
regulation of the oil and gas industry and how the Commission uses its
powers to further that purpose. Part II examines the cases prior to Hebble
that discuss which actions by the Commission warrant an imposition of
fiduciary duties upon oil and gas operators. Part III provides a summary of
the facts in Hebble, as well as an account of the court’s limited reasoning
and analysis. Part IV points out the deficiencies in Hebble’s reasoning and
details the implications for oil and gas operators in Oklahoma moving
forward. Part V briefly concludes.

9.
10.
11.
12.

See Hebble, 238 P.3d at 943.
See generally 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 287.1-287.15, 87.1(a) (2000).
See Hebble, 238 P.3d at 943.
See id. at 942.
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II. Pre-Hebble Oklahoma Law Regarding the Relationship Between an
Operator and Interested Parties to an Oil and Gas Lease
A. The Statutory Power of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
Beginning in the late-nineteenth century, courts throughout the country
began to adopt and apply the rule of capture to oil and gas extraction by
analogizing the movement of subsurface hydrocarbons to the movement of
water and wild animals.13 The rule of capture states: “[t]he owner of a tract
of land acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells drilled
thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from
adjoining lands.”14 According to the rule of capture, an adjoining
landowner’s only remedy is to drill his own well to “offset” the drainage by
his neighbor.15
If left unregulated, the offset drilling remedy has many negative
consequences. If too many offset wells are drilled, economic waste occurs
because far more wells are drilled than are necessary to drain the oil and gas
from the reservoir efficiently.16 Over-drilling can also damage the natural
reservoir energy necessary to extract the oil and gas and result in irreparable
damage to the recoverability of valuable hydrocarbons.17 Once the natural
reservoir energy has dissipated, extraction of the oil or gas often becomes
economically unfeasible.18 In addition, excess drilling equipment and
surface locations required to drill unnecessary offset wells result in
additional environmental impacts.19 Lastly, the high production rate causes
supply to smother demand, resulting in price depression and environmental
problems associated with storing the excess supply.20
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission has been granted
administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers allowing it to regulate
Oklahoma’s oil and gas industry and counteract the negative effects of the

13. See Westmoreland Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889).
14. Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas
Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 900 (2005) (quoting Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of
Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 393 (1935)).
15. See id. at 909-10.
16. See Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization Under the 2004
Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 277, 278 (2004).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
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rule of capture.21 The Commission’s goals are two-fold: (1) to prevent
surface, underground, and economic waste and (2) to protect the correlative
rights of mineral owners so that each owner gets a fair and equitable share
of the minerals beneath his tract.22 The protection of “correlative rights”
first began as a judicial effort designed to prevent operators from taking an
undue proportion of oil or gas from a common source of supply by allowing
all landowners the opportunity to obtain a fair and equitable share of the oil
or gas. The protection of correlative rights is now made explicit by
Oklahoma’s conservation statute.23 The Commission wields a variety of
tools to enhance its efforts to prevent waste and protect correlative rights,
including the establishment of drilling and spacing units, forced pooling,
and unitization.24
1. Drilling and Spacing Units
The most important tool the Commission uses to protect against waste is
the creation of drilling and spacing units.25 The Commission can control
how many wells are drilled in each reservoir by establishing drilling and
spacing units, thereby preventing underground, economic, and surface
waste and protecting the correlative rights of neighboring landowners.26
The Commission reviews and interprets geological evidence to determine
the proper size and shape of the unit, which should be uniform with other
units in a common reservoir absent special geological justifications.27
Oklahoma’s current statute allows only one well to be drilled per spacing
unit unless another well is reasonably necessary to drain a common source
of supply efficiently.28
In addition to establishing the density and location of drilling,
Oklahoma’s statute apportions production to each owner within the unit on
a net acreage basis regardless of the location of the well within the unit.29
In other words, the drilling and spacing order pools the royalty interests—

21. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 873 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Okla. 1994).
22. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(a) (2000).
23. See Kingwood Oil Co. v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 396 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Okla. 1964).
24. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1; see also 52 OKLA. STAT. § 287.1.
25. Joseph R. Dancy & Victoria A. Dancy, Regulation of the Oil and Gas Industry by
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 21 TULSA L.J. 613, 627 (1986); see also 52 OKLA.
STAT. § 87.1(a).
26. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(a).
27. See id. § 87.1(c).
28. See id.
29. See id. § 87.1(a).
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those interests entitled to a proportion of the production—as if production is
directly and proportionately attributable to each net acre within the unit.30
2. Forced Pooling
Oklahoma’s forced pooling statute works in conjunction with the drilling
and spacing order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights. When a
drilling and spacing unit includes multiple undivided mineral interests or
separately owned tracts, an agreement must be reached in order to pool
lands for mutual development of the unit or else an account must be made
to the non-consenting parties for their share of the profits.31 Under
Oklahoma’s forced pooling statute, any party with a present right to drill
can apply to force pool any interests that refuse to cooperate in the
development of a valid drilling and spacing unit.32 Although the forced
pooling order alters the private property rights of the parties involved, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has held Oklahoma’s forced pooling statute to be
a valid exercise of the state’s police power.33
The forced pooling statute encourages development of the state’s natural
resources by fairly apportioning risk. Without a forced pooling statute, a
co-tenant who refused to participate in a well would still be entitled to his
proportionate share of the proceeds minus his share of the reasonable and
necessary costs.34 If the operations failed and the operator lost the well, the
co-tenant bore none of the risk of drilling and therefore would not be
responsible for any of the costs of the failed well. To promote
development, the forced pooling order requires the working interest owners
to either participate in the well and pay their proportionate share of the well
costs or transfer their interest to the participating parties on trade terms
determined by the market value of similar transactions in the immediate
vicinity.35 At least two alternatives are offered to the non-participating
party and the transfer can take various forms, such as a sale, lease, or farmout agreement.36
30. See Fleet v. Sanguine, Ltd., 854 P.2d 892, n.12 (Okla. 1993).
31. See Meeker v. Denver Producing & Ref. Co., 188 P.2d 854, 856 (Okla. 1947).
32. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e).
33. See Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 P.2d 997 (Okla. 1951).
34. See Meeker, 188 P.2d at 856.
35. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e).
36. A farmout agreement is defined as:
a contract to assign rights in acreage upon the completion of a drilling obligation and the
performance of the other provisions contained in the contract. Such an agreement allows a
lessee who does not wish to drill to assign all or part of the lease to another operator who
does wish to drill.
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3. Unitization
In contrast to the forced pooling order, unitization usually encompasses
an entire reservoir.37 Drilling operations will eventually deplete the natural
energy of a reservoir even if it is properly conserved.38 Secondary or
enhanced recovery operations are designed to maintain or artificially
enhance depleted reservoir energy. To facilitate secondary recovery
operations and protect correlative rights, a unitized reservoir is operated as
a single unit by a single, Commission-appointed unit operator.39
Unitization is often appropriate for mature, significantly depleted fields that
require some type of extraordinary measures, such as waterflooding, to
extract minerals from the subsurface after primary recovery techniques
Since these techniques require operations
have been exhausted.40
throughout the entire reservoir, unitization is necessary to combine all of
the property interests that overlay the reservoir.41
Similar to the forced pooling order, the unitization order sets forth the
manner in which costs are to be allocated and appoints a single unit
operator.42 A unitization order differs from forced pooling and drilling and
spacing units in that the unitization order takes into account prior
production history and allocates production and costs based on those areas
that have proven to be productive within the unit area.43 Acreage
geologically proven to be non-productive would not share in the production
from a unitization order, unlike a drilling and spacing unit, in which all
acreage shares equally based on the size of the interest instead of the
productivity.44
Although secondary recovery techniques are often appropriate for many
reservoirs, achieving unitization through voluntary agreement is generally
difficult due to the transaction costs of securing multi-party agreements.
Compulsory unitization partially addresses this problem, but Oklahoma law
requires substantial voluntary agreement before the Commission may force
58 C.J.S. MINES AND MINERALS § 385 (2010); see also Dancy & Dancy, supra note 25, at
643-44.
37. See Anderson & Smith, supra note 16, at 284.
38. See id.
39. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 287.4.
40. See Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155,
1168 (1952).
41. See id.
42. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 287.4.
43. See id.
44. See id.
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holdouts to unitize.45 Many times, the required percentage of voluntary
agreement will not be reached even though the area is a prime candidate for
unitization operations.
4. Private Joint Operating Agreements
Joint operating agreements are private, voluntary agreements among
interested parties for the operation of a tract or leasehold for oil, gas, and
other minerals.46 The parties to a joint operating agreement typically agree
to appoint one party as operator of the premises for the joint benefit of all
parties, and the parties share in the expenses and proceeds.47 Since no state
action is involved, general contract principles require that the parties’
relationship be governed by the express terms of the agreement.48 In
Oklahoma, no fiduciary duty arises from the parties entering into a joint
operating agreement.49 A fiduciary duty can arise from a voluntary
agreement if specific facts suggest a special relationship of trust was
contracted for among the parties.50
B. An Oil and Gas Operator’s Fiduciary Obligations Prior to Hebble
Oklahoma's rule defining the relationship between a lessor and lessee of
an oil and gas lease was stated in Bunger v. Rogers in 1941.51 In that case,
the lessor sued the lessee for underpayment of royalty.52 According to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court:
The defendants were merely lessees under an oil and gas mining
lease and were under no obligation to the plaintiff, other than to
pay the rent and royalty provided in said lease, and if they
breached this duty then their liability was purely a contractual
one and in no sense fiduciary.53

45. See id. See generally Anderson & Smith, supra note 16, at 284-86.
46. 3 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 29:6 (3d ed. 2010).
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., Pitco Prod. Co. v. Chaparral Energy Inc., 63 P.3d 541 (Okla. 2003).
49. See Tarrant v. Capstone Oil & Gas Co., 178 P.3d 866, 870-71 (Okla. Civ. App.
2008).
50. See David E. Pierce, Transactional Evolution of Operating Agreements in the Oil
and Gas Industry (Mar. 2008) (presentation before the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation).
51. See 112 P.2d 361, 362 (Okla. 1941).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 363.
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A lessor and lessee are merely contracting parties, and thus no fiduciary
relationship arises.
In contrast, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded in Young v. West
Edmond Hunton Lime Unit that in a unitization, an appointed unit operator
may owe fiduciary duties to other unitized parties.54 In Young, the plaintiffs
(lessors) leased their mineral rights to various oil companies (lessees).55 A
productive formation was subsequently found on the lessors’ lands and the
Commission, pursuant to its statutory authority, ordered this field to be
produced as a single unit by an appointed unit operator.56 This order
allocated production to the interested parties based on the potential
productivity of each tract in the unit and deprived the lessees of the right to
produce oil or gas from the lessors’ lands.57 The mineral rights owners
were compelled to give up their right to produce from their lands in
exchange for a portion of the production from the larger unitized area.58
The court analogized the position of the appointed operator of the unit to
that of a trustee, because the royalty owners had no say in the management
of the unit or in the selection of the unit operator.59 On a subsequent
appeal, the court further stated that “the Unit, under the circumstances of its
fiduciary relationship as revealed by the record, must account to the royalty
owners, as to its handling of their affairs.”60
In Olansen v. Texaco Inc. the Oklahoma Supreme Court further
emphasized what effect a state modification of rights had on the
relationship between an operator and interest owner.61 In 1961, the
Commission created the East Glenn Unit pursuant to Oklahoma’s
unitization statute and named Texaco as the operator.62 The unit was
comprised of only one lease, in which the appellees owned an interest in
forty of the 160 acres (25%).63 Texaco neglected to check the county
records in order to identify the interest held by the appellees and failed to
pay the appellees their share of production.64 Under the terms of the lease
to Texaco, appellees were not entitled to share in the production unless a
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See generally 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954).
Id. at 306.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 308.
See id. at 309.
W. Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Young, 325 P.2d 1047, 1052 (Okla. 1958).
See generally 587 P.2d 976 (Okla. 1978).
Id. at 978.
Id.
Id. at 979.
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well was drilled directly on their forty-acre tract.65 The unitization order,
however, entitled the appellees to proportionally share in production from
the entire unit despite such limitation.66 The court noted that the
Commission unitization order modified the rights between the parties and
relied on this fact as the basis for its conclusion that Texaco owed the
appellees a fiduciary duty.67 The court rejected Texaco’s reliance on
Bunger, stating: “The pivotal issue here is not the relationship between a
unit operator and a mineral owner but the critical concern involves the legal
effect of resort to police powers of the state on the part of the lessee
(Texaco) which modified and amended existing legal rights . . . .”68
The Oklahoma Supreme Court again distinguished the lease relationship
from the unitization relationship in Leck v. Continental Oil Co.69 On a
federally certified question from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court reiterated that the lease agreement creates no
fiduciary duty.70 The court stated, “This duty is not created by the lease
agreement but rather by the unitization order and agreement.”71
Most recently, in Howell v. Texaco Inc., the Oklahoma Supreme Court
addressed whether a drilling and spacing unit alone created a fiduciary
relationship.72 The plaintiffs in Howell had entered into lease contracts and
communitization agreements with Texaco, or in some instances with
Texaco’s predecessor, and sued Texaco for improper payment of
royalties.73 Although the Commission had unitized some of the plaintiffs’
land, much of the land remained subject to the sole authority of the
voluntary development agreements reached between the plaintiffs and
Texaco.74
Echoing previous holdings, the court stated, “The
communitization agreements, unlike unitization orders, are contracts just as
the leases are contracts . . . . the communitization agreements do not create
a fiduciary duty on Texaco’s part.”75

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 981.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 985.
See generally 800 P.2d 224 (Okla. 1989).
See id. at 229.
Id.
See generally 112 P.3d 1154 (Okla. 2004).
Id. at 1157.
Id.
Id. at 1160.
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The Howell plaintiffs explicitly petitioned the court to analogize the
drilling and spacing unit to a unitization order in their briefs to the court.76
Since part of the plaintiffs’ lands had not been unitized by the Commission,
the plaintiffs had to convince the court that a drilling and spacing unit
(operated pursuant to a lease or communitization agreement) should impose
the same fiduciary obligations on operators as unitization orders.77 The
court failed to see the merit in the plaintiffs’ argument, stating:
The plaintiffs have misconstrued [the] cases. This court has not
held that a royalty lease alone creates a fiduciary relationship.
To the extent that other courts have so held when applying
Oklahoma law, they have misread our decisions. Texaco had no
fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs based on the leases or the
communitization agreement.78
Up until Hebble v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., the creation of a drilling
and spacing unit was not a valid basis for imposing a fiduciary duty on an
operator.79
III. Hebble v. Shell Western E & P, Inc.: The Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals Imposes a Fiduciary Duty on an Operator Pursuant to a Drilling
and Spacing Order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
A. Facts and Procedural History
Shell desired to conduct secondary recovery operations on a lease
(Crews Lease) in which the appellees (Owners) had reserved an interest in
the net-profits from oil and gas operations.80 Shell obtained unitization
orders from the Commission and was appointed as the unit operator for the
Brittain Sims Unit in 1964 and the Brittain Deese Unit in 1970.81 Shell
subsequently petitioned the Commission for a drilling and spacing unit for
the Sycamore formation in 1972 and was granted an eighty-acre drilling
and spacing unit.82 Pursuant to a voluntary joint operating agreement, Shell
was appointed the operator of the Brittain Deep No. 2 Sycamore well.83
76. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Defendants-Appellants at 5, Hebble v. Shell W.
E&P, Inc., 238 P.3d 939 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (No. 106,470).
77. See Howell, 112 P.3d at 1160.
78. Id. at 1161.
79. 238 P.3d 939 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) cert. denied.
80. Id. at 941-42; see also Shell Oil Co. v. Hebble, 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010), cert. denied.
81. Hebble, 238 P.3d at 941-42.
82. Id. at 942.
83. Id.
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Shell eventually sold its interest in the Crews Lease to Maynard Oil
Company (Maynard) in 1985.84
The Crews Lease—and therefore the Owners’ net-profits interest—was
included in the Brittain Sims Unit, Brittain Deese Unit, and Brittain Deep
No. 2 Sycamore well.85 However, Shell failed to pay the Owners $715,090
from the net-profits of the Brittain Deep No. 2 Sycamore well and $35,617
from the net-profits of the Brittain Deese Unit.86 Owners brought suit
against Shell and Maynard in 1995 based on tort theories as the five-year
statute of limitations for contract had expired.87 Maynard settled with the
Owners, while Shell decided to litigate.88 Shell made multiple motions for
summary judgment based on its statute of limitations argument but the trial
court ruled that Shell owed the Owners a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty
arising from the Commission’s "unitization" orders.89
The matter
proceeded to a jury trial in 2008 and the Owners were awarded $13,205,916
in actual damages on grounds of: (1) false representation, nondisclosure or
concealment, deceit, or constructive fraud, and (2) breach of fiduciary
duty.90 The Owners were also awarded $53,625,000 in punitive damages.91
B. The Opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision.92 Its opinion began with an examination of precedent
regarding an operator’s duty as fiduciary.93 The court reasoned that
because the unitization relationship is not voluntarily assumed by the
parties, but instead is mandated by the state, the exercise of the police
power of the state creates a trustee-like relationship between the operator
and those parties interested in production from the unit.94 The court of civil
appeals then equated a unitization order under title, 52, section 287.1 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, with a drilling and spacing order under title 52, section
87.1.95
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 947.
See id. at 943.
See id.
See id.
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Relying on existing precedent from Howell and Leck, the court
characterized Shell’s relationship to the Owners in the Brittain Deese Unit
as fiduciary in nature since it arose from a Commission “unitization”
order.96 Because a private joint operating agreement was reached among
the working interest partners, the court admitted that the Brittain Deep No.
2 Sycamore unit was “less clear-cut,” but reasoned that since the Owners
were not parties to the joint operating agreement, it had no bearing on the
relationship between Shell and the Owners.97 The court concluded that
since the Brittain Deep No. 2 Sycamore was not drilled on the Crews Lease,
Shell’s duty to pay the Owners from the net-profits of the well arose from
the drilling and spacing order of the Commission and therefore the police
powers of the state.98 The court affirmed the actual and punitive damages
flowing from the fiduciary duty created by the Commission’s exercise of
state police power.99
IV. Hebble Misunderstands the Nature of the Drilling and Spacing Unit,
Misconstrues the Case Law, and Misguides the Future of Oklahoma Oil
and Gas Law
A. The Reasons Justifying a Fiduciary Standard for Unitization Orders Do
Not Justify a Fiduciary Standard for a Drilling and Spacing Order
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals fails to explain its view that a
drilling and spacing order is analogous to a unitization order.100 Although
the court recites case law generally relevant to the fiduciary obligations of
an operator, the court’s analysis of the particular facts in Hebble provides
no distinct justification for its expansion of fiduciary obligations to drilling
and spacing units.101 This expansion is justified neither by the nature of the
drilling and spacing unit nor by Oklahoma's case law.
Olansen requires that the state modify the existing legal rights of
interested parties before a fiduciary duty can be imposed on the operator.102
Obtaining a drilling and spacing order is one of the initial steps in drilling a
well that merely helps define the rights among the parties. The correlative
rights doctrine gives royalty owners an opportunity to secure a fair share of
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See Olansen v. Texaco, 587 P.2d 976 (Okla. 1978).
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oil or gas from a common reservoir; the establishment of a drilling and
spacing unit does not change this fundamental right. In fact, the drilling
and spacing order changes two things: (1) production from the unit is
divided proportionately among all royalty owners within the unit regardless
of which part of the unit production actually occurs and (2) the location of
the well is determined by the drilling and spacing order. In Hebble, the
plaintiffs owned a net-profits interest, which means the plaintiffs assigned
their working interest (and accompanying right to drill) and reserved a right
to a portion of the net proceeds from any subsequent oil or gas
production.103 Because the plaintiffs owned neither a royalty interest nor
the right to drill, the drilling and spacing unit had no direct effect on the
plaintiffs’ net-profits interest. Conceptually, the plaintiffs’ interest was
nothing more than a contractual burden on a working interest owner to
receive a portion of any net proceeds secured from oil and gas production.
A drilling and spacing order does not appoint an operator of the unit. In
Hebble, Shell became the operator of the drilling and spacing unit by
reaching a voluntary joint operating agreement with the other working
interest owners. Prior to the joint operating agreement, any working
interest owner could have force pooled the unit and petitioned the
Commission to be appointed unit operator. Only after the joint operating
agreement was signed did Shell have the exclusive right to drill. Having
leased their working interest, the net-profits interest owners had no say in
the choice of the operator. The plaintiffs or the plaintiffs’ predecessors-ininterest had assigned that right away when they decided to lease their
working interest rights. Misunderstanding the mechanics of the net-profits
transaction, the court reasoned, “[h]ad the [net-profits] Owners been parties
to the JOA, we would not find a fiduciary duty.”104 The court failed to
recognize that the net-profits owners voluntarily assigned their right to be a
party to a joint operating agreement when they leased their working
interest, thereby voluntarily relinquishing any voice in the selection of an
operator and implicitly approving any selection made.
Since the Brittain Deep No. 2 Sycamore well was drilled pursuant to a
joint operating agreement, the police powers of the state were not
implicated. The Hebble court’s reliance on the drilling and spacing order as
a state modification of existing legal rights of the parties contradicts the
nature and purpose of the drilling and spacing unit. There are key statutory
distinctions between a drilling and spacing unit and a unitization order that
103. See Hebble, 238 P.3d at 941.
104. Id. at 943.
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makes imposing fiduciary obligations appropriate in one instance and not
the other. Oklahoma’s unitization statute expressly anticipates that the
unitization order will modify the rights of the parties involved, providing:
“Property rights, leases, contracts, and all other rights and obligations shall
be regarded as amended and modified to the extent necessary to conform to
the provisions and requirements of this act . . . .”105 The statute authorizing
the Commission to create drilling and spacing units contains no such
provision, presumably because the statute was not intended to modify the
rights of any parties involved.106
The unitization act also requires that “[e]ach unit shall be authorized on
behalf and for the account of all the owners of the oil and gas rights within
the area, without profit to the unit, to supervise, manage and conduct further
development and operations for the production of the oil and gas . . . .”107
The need for the “without profit” language is derived from the method of
production allocation in the unitization act:
A separately owned tract’s fair, equitable and reasonable share
of the unit production shall be measured by the value of each
such tract for oil and gas purposes and its contributing value to
the unit in relation to like values of other tracts in the unit,
taking into account acreage, the quantity of oil and gas
recoverable therefrom, location on structure, its probable
productivity of oil and gas in the absence of unit operations, the
burden of operation to which the tract will or is likely to be
subjected, or so many of said factors, or such other pertinent
engineering, geological, or operating factors, as may be
reasonably susceptible of determination.108
Absent the “without profit” language, an operator could theoretically
operate the unit in such a way as to maximize production from the areas in
which the operator has the greatest interest and amend the unitization order
to re-allocate a greater percentage of production to the operator-owned
tracts.109
105. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 287.9 (2000).
106. See generally id. §§ 87.1-87.5.
107. Id. § 287.8.
108. Id. § 287.4.
109. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 76, at 13
(providing a detailed analysis and discussion concerning why statutory protections exist to
protect against conflicts of interest in the unitization statute, but are correctly absent from the
drilling and spacing statute).
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The drilling and spacing statute contains no such “without profit”
language.110 In contrast, an operator of an oil and gas lease in Oklahoma
must make a profit from its operations to keep operating the lease.111 Also,
all tracts within a drilling and spacing unit share proportionately in
production, regardless of profitability.112 An operator gains no advantage
by excluding production to those tracts within the drilling and spacing unit
that are owned by the operator. Of course, other conflicts of interests can
arise between an operator and royalty owners in a drilling and spacing unit
but prior to Hebble, Oklahoma chose to handle those conflicts with an
increased standard of judicial scrutiny, not the imposition of a fiduciary
duty.113 For instance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court developed a different
method to calculate royalty payments when an operator sells production to
an affiliated entity.114
B. Hebble Misconstrues the Line of Cases Imposing Fiduciary Obligations
on Operators and Unduly Expands Oklahoma’s Jurisprudence
Hebble principally relies on Howell, Leck, and Olansen to expand
fiduciary obligations to drilling and spacing units. These cases provide no
support for the conclusion reached in Hebble. In Howell, the court speaks
expressly in terms of “unitization” when outlining the appropriate
circumstances for the imposition of a fiduciary duty and refers to the term
“unitization” with reference to Oklahoma’s Unitization Act, not the drilling
and spacing unit.115 Hebble ignores this important distinction, stating,
“After unitization, the leases no longer control,” and inappropriately cites to
Howell for support.116 Howell’s interpretation of the unitization statute,
while potentially useful to help interpret the drilling and spacing statute,
does not provide direct support for the conclusion that a fiduciary duty
accompanies a drilling and spacing unit. As stated supra in the discussion
of the Howell opinion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court implicitly rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that a drilling and spacing unit confers a fiduciary duty
on an operator.117
110. See generally 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 87.1-87.5.
111. See Smith v. Marshall, 85 P.3d 830 (Okla. 2004).
112. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(a).
113. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 76, at 13 (citing
Howell v. Texaco, Inc., 112 P.3d 1154, 1160 (Okla. 2004); Spaeth v. Union Oil Co. of Cal.,
710 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1983)).
114. See Howell, 112 P.3d at 1160.
115. See id. at 1160-61.
116. Hebble v. Shell W. E&P, Inc., 238 P.3d 939, 943 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010).
117. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 76, at 5.
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Leck also fails to provide direct support for Hebble’s holding. Hebble
states, “The fiduciary duty of the unit operator arises not only from the
creation of field-wide units for secondary recovery under Oklahoma’s
Unitization Act, but also from the creation of drilling and spacing units
under 52 O.S.Supp.2007 §87.1” and cites Leck as an example.118 The facts
and language of Leck provide dubious support for this proposition. Leck
states, “[A fiduciary duty] is not a duty created by a lease agreement but
rather by the unitization order and agreement . . . . The only fiduciary duty
owed the appellants was created by the unitization of Section 21.”119 The
pure language of Leck appears to simply re-state and apply existing case
law applying a fiduciary duty to a unitization order.
Unfortunately, Leck adds confusion to the case law because the unit at
issue in that case was actually a drilling and spacing unit, not a unitization
order.120 The Hebble court seems to reconcile this inconsistency by
assuming Leck meant to expand fiduciary duties to drilling and spacing
units. An equally valid assumption, however, is that Leck simply confused
the proper meaning of “unitization.” In fact, all the cases Leck relies on use
the term “unitization” in its proper statutory sense, referring to an order
issued pursuant to Oklahoma’s Unitization Act.121 Surely Leck did not
intend to expand fiduciary duties to drilling and spacing units without any
mention or discussion of the consequences of this significant shift in
jurisprudence. Regardless, the language in Leck should most properly be
considered dicta since the true holding of Leck regarded the proper subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal district court.122
Howell appears to provide strong support for the proposition that Leck
simply confused “unitization” with a drilling and spacing unit. Howell held
that no fiduciary relationship existed despite the fact that drilling and
spacing units had been created on portions of the plaintiffs’ lease and were
at issue in that case.123 After discussing Oklahoma’s case law on the
fiduciary duty of operators, including Leck, the Howell court concludes:
“The plaintiffs [arguing for drilling and spacing units to trigger fiduciary
duties] have misconstrued these cases . . . . To the extent that other courts
have so held when applying Oklahoma law, they have misread our

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Hebble, 238 P.3d at 942.
Leck v. Cont’l Oil Co., 800 P.2d 224, 229 (Okla. 1989).
See id. at 225.
See id. at 228-29.
See id. at 229.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 76, at 5.
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decisions.”124 Even assuming Leck actually meant to expand the case law
as Hebble purports it does, Howell overrules this proposition.
Furthermore, Leck is distinguishable from Hebble because the
Commission force pooled the unit in Leck.125 Since the forced pooling
order pools the cost-bearing interests and appoints an operator, some of the
same elements that make a fiduciary duty appropriate for a unitization order
are also present in a forced pooling order.126 The key requirement that the
state modify the rights of the parties is arguably satisfied by the forced
pooling order, unlike the drilling and spacing unit.
Hebble goes on to state, “The critical factor is the resort to the police
powers of the state on the part of a lessee in unitization proceedings which
modify and amend existing legal rights” and cites Olansen for support.127
Olansen’s fiduciary duty analysis refers specifically to Oklahoma’s
unitization statute and how a specific unitization order modified the legal
rights of the parties affected.128 Indeed, the Olansen opinion specifically
notes that the unitization order is statutorily authorized to amend existing
legal rights.129 Olansen’s analysis also does not provide direct support for
the proposition that a drilling and spacing unit should be treated like a
unitization order. With regard to the fiduciary obligations of operators, the
court in Hebble equates a drilling and spacing unit to a unitization order
with no direct support for its proposition and no discussion of the
justifications for its expansion of Oklahoma law.
C. The Practical Realties of Operating an Oil and Gas Well Post-Hebble
A state’s legal landscape affects the attractiveness of doing business
within that state’s borders. Chesapeake Energy’s recent experience in
Roane County, West Virginia serves as a relevant and sobering example. In
2007, Chesapeake lost a judgment for $404 million, $270 million of which
was punitive damages, for a case involving under-paid royalties.130 West
Virginia was one of only two jurisdictions at the time that did not provide

124. Howell v. Texaco, Inc., 112 P.3d 1154, 1161 (Okla. 2004).
125. See Leck, 800 P.2d at 225.
126. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (2000).
127. Hebble v. Shell W. E&P, Inc., 238 P.2d 939, 942 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010).
128. See generally Olansen v. Texaco, Inc., 587 P.2d 976 (Okla. 1978).
129. See id. at 981.
130. Juliet A. Terry, $404M Roane County Verdict Upheld, WBOY.COM (June 28, 2007),
http://66.118.80.206/story.cfm?func=viewstory&storyid=25731&catid=182.
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an automatic appellate review procedure.131 The Roane County judge
simply reviewed jury’s decision and upheld the entire jury award.132
The effect on both Chesapeake and West Virginia was substantial. Soon
thereafter, Chesapeake announced that it was cancelling its plans to build a
$40 million regional headquarters office in Charleston, West Virginia.133
Aubrey McClendon, Chesapeake’s CEO, commented, “At the time, we
realized that until West Virginia’s judicial system provides fair and
unbiased access to its courts for everyone, a prudent company must be very
cautious in committing further resources in the state.”134
Likewise, Hebble puts Oklahoma at a competitive disadvantage with
other states. Although oil and gas producing states have large and
complicated bodies of case law defining an operator’s appropriate standard
of conduct in a variety of different factual scenarios, many states generally
accept the proposition that the unique nature of a unitization order requires
an enhanced standard of conduct by the operator.135 However, Hebble’s
imposition of a fiduciary standard on an operator because of a drilling and
spacing (or analogous) order is unprecedented.136 The vast majority of
wells drilled in Oklahoma are drilled pursuant to a drilling and spacing
order. The Commission rarely unitizes lands because of the substantial
voluntary agreement required and the large amount of land such a unit
encompasses.137 Hebble imposes a fiduciary duty upon thousands of
drilling and spacing unit operators, past and present.
Presumably, an operator who took the care to bargain expressly for no
fiduciary responsibility will lose the benefit of this bargain when the
operator becomes operator of a drilling and spacing unit. This is true even
though the drilling and spacing statute contains no language authorizing the
drilling and spacing order to amend the contracts between the parties.138
Hebble re-writes the initial bargain and renders meaningless certain aspects
of common oil and gas contracts such as leas, communitization agreements,
nd JOAs.
131. Justin Anderson & Chris Dickerson, Chesapeake Partly Blames Verdict for
Departure, W.VA. RECORD (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.wvrecord.com/news/217651-chesa
peake-partly-blames-verdict-for-departure.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND
UNITIZATION § 19.04 (3d ed. 1994).
136. See id.
137. Anderson & Smith, supra note 16, at 285.
138. See generally 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 87.1-87.5 (2000).
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What liabilities does a company inherit when it takes over the operation
of a well from another party? This was possibly the greatest unanswered
question from Hebble. This question was left unanswered because
Maynard, Shell’s successor-in-interest, settled with the plaintiffs in Hebble
and was dismissed from the case.139 Successors-in-interest like Maynard
could be acquiring decades of tort liability. Oil and gas companies must
already pay for a rigorous due diligence process when acquiring properties.
Adding an investigation into each well’s fulfillment of its fiduciary
obligations could be an untenable transactional cost. This scenario could be
the next step in this line of fiduciary jurisprudence. Imposing higher
transaction costs on one of Oklahoma’s most important industries deserves
far more scrutiny than the limited discussion offered by Hebble’s analysis.
Hopefully, the Oklahoma Supreme Court will soon address the “Maynard
Question” and will reexamine Hebble’s dubious foundation. Rather than
dealing with the unwanted effects of Hebble, the court should overrule this
opinion and return Oklahoma to the stable line of pre-Hebble fiduciary
jurisprudence.
V. Conclusion
The purpose and statutory definition of the unitization order is distinct
from the drilling and spacing unit. Such distinctions justify imposing a
fiduciary burden on an operator only when a unitization order is involved.
A drilling and spacing unit simply pools of the royalty interests. In contrast,
a unitization order amends the legal rights of the parties involved by
allocating all production and costs and appointing a unit operator.
Oklahoma courts have consistently recognized the distinctions between a
unitization order and a drilling and spacing unit and have imposed fiduciary
obligations only where unitization orders have amended the legal rights of
the parties involved. Hebble expands an operator’s fiduciary obligation to
drilling and spacing units without a statutory justification or precedent. The
meager analysis in Hebble fails to communicate a logical basis for the
expansion and creates a confusing legal landscape for past and future
operators of drilling and spacing units currently attempting to negotiate oil
and gas contracts and assess potential fiduciary liability.
Brad Secrist

139. See Hebble v. Shell W. E&P, Inc., 238 P.3d 939, 942 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010).
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